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PATENT REFORM AND DAMAGES APPORTIONMENT:
ADDRESSING THE CONCERNS OF INDUSTRY-SCALE USERS
OF THE U.S. PATENT SYSTEM WITHOUT LEGISLATIVELY
MANDATING A “SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTION OVER THE
PRIOR ART”
∗

Megan L. Wiggins

I.

INTRODUCTION

A controversial debate within United States patent law shows no
signs of a quick resolution and divides inventors, companies, and
practitioners in the field. Within a broader discussion of patent
reform, issues about damages awards for patent infringement continue to be contentious. On one side, interested parties argue that
modern legislation is needed to control the costs of litigation and
1
tighten the standards for calculating damages awards. On the other
side, opponents counter that no evidence indicates that damages
2
reform is necessary. The outcome will significantly affect a number
of industries involved with the patent system.
Under U.S. patent law, which is the source of the damages debate, the rights of inventors and patentees tend to expand and con3
tract over time. Although patent rights have strengthened over the
∗
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1
See, e.g., Patent Reform in the 111th Congress: Legislation and Recent Court Decisions:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 5–8 (2009) [hereinafter Patent
Reform] (statement of Steven R. Appleton, Chairman & Chief Executive Officer, Micron Technology, Inc.), available at http://www.patentfairness.org/pdf/
appleton_20090310.pdf.
2
See, e.g., id. at 11–13 (statement of Philip S. Johnson, Chief Intellectual Property Counsel, Johnson & Johnson), available at http://www.patentsmatter.com/issue/
pdfs/20090310_johnson_testimony.pdf.
3
Compare Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307, 309, 310 (1980) (construing patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 broadly to include a humanmade strain of bacteria), with In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 949, 951, 963–66 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (en banc) (holding that a “method of hedging risk in the field of commodities
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last several decades, the scope of those rights has begun to narrow.
One important sign of this trend is a series of opinions by the Supreme Court of the United States that shrink the sphere of patent
5
protection. Other recent developments include several congression6
al attempts at legislative patent reform. Legislative-reform proposals
are especially noteworthy, as the present patent laws date back to the
7
Patent Act of 1952.
Although patent-reform efforts stalled in the past, the value of
8
intellectual property to the United States promises major changes.
9
Indeed, the Patent Reform Act of 2009 (2009 Act), demonstrates by

trading” is not patentable subject matter), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009). Notably, one judge in Bilski suggested that the oft-quoted statement that patentable subject matter “include[s] anything under the sun that is made by man,” Chakrabarty,
447 U.S. at 309 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6
(1952)) (internal quotations omitted), was based on a misreading of legislative
records. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1000 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
4
See generally Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303.
5
See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 401–02, 415, 418–19 (2007) (rejecting the teaching-suggestion-motivation test as sole way of proving obviousness);
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128–29, 137 (2007) (holding
that a licensee of a patent need not breach or terminate license agreement before
seeking declaratory judgment against licensor); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,
547 U.S. 388, 391–93 (2006) (holding that the traditional four-part test for injunctive
relief must be satisfied before an injunction is granted and that a finding of infringement alone is insufficient); In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1371
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (finding that willful infringement requires objective recklessness), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1445 (2008).
6
See Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 610, 111th Cong. (2009) (as referred to S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 17, 2009); Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th
Cong. (2009) (as referred to S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009); Patent
Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. (2009) (as referred to H.R. Comm. on
the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009); Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong.
(2007) (as passed by House of Representatives, Sept. 7, 2007); Patent Reform Act of
2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007); Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong.
(2006); Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005).
7
Patent (Bryson) Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified as amended
at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (2006)).
8
See infra notes 34–35 and accompanying text.
9
Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 610, 111th Cong. (2009) (as referred to S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 17, 2009); Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th
Cong. (2009) (as referred to S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009); Patent
Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. (2009) (as referred to H.R. Comm. on
the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009). This Comment discusses damages apportionment,
which is frequently present in Congress’s attempts to reform damages awards. The
Senate Committee on the Judiciary retreated from mandatory apportionment in an
amended version of the 2009 Act, which was introduced to the full Senate in April
2009. See S. REP. NO. 111-18, at 34–35 (2009). The amended bill would allow judges
flexibility where mandatory apportionment would not because judges would have a
“gatekeeper” role. Stephanie Condon, Senate Panel Approves Patent Reform Bill, CNET
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its mere existence, as well as its detailed provisions, that Congress appreciates the value of intellectual property. In its various forms, the
2009 Act comprehensively addresses various reform-centric topics, in10
11
cluding filing priority, post-grant procedures, and remedies, most
12
particularly the damages provisions. The 2009 Act, which is Con13
gress’s fourth attempt at patent reform in recent years, ensures that
patent reform will continue to be a source of lively debate for years to
14
come. The persistence of legislators, lobbyists, and commentators
alike in discussing the shape and propriety of reform reflects the potentially major effects of legislative change on industry-scale users of
the patent system.
In any discussion about patent reform, questions about the
proper assessment and calculation of patent-infringement damages
are apt to arise. The United States Code, which governs patent law
and procedure, permits damages as one type of remedy for patent in15
fringement. Generally, a patentee may seek compensatory damages,

NEWS, Apr. 2, 2009, http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10210824-38.html (internal
quotation marks omitted). While the amended bill is certainly a positive development, apportionment is still a part of the recent bill introduced in the House of Representatives and repeatedly appeared in earlier reform efforts. See H.R. 1260 § 5(a);
see also sources cited infra note 26. Consequently, for discussion purposes, this
Comment assumes that Congress will, at some point, legislatively mandate apportionment. Thus, citations to the Senate bill generally will refer to the version that
contained mandatory apportionment. And even if Congress passes a bill without
mandatory apportionment, the debate over the propriety of the approach would likely continue. Representatives of several major technology companies expressed approval of the amendments, but they seemed to expect that more changes would be
forthcoming. See Condon, supra.
10
Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 610, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009) (as referred to S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 17, 2009); Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th
Cong. § 2 (2009) (as referred to S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009); H.R. 1260
§ 3.
11
S. 610 § 5; S. 515 § 5; H.R. 1260 § 6.
12
S. 610 § 4; S. 515 § 4; H.R. 1260 § 5.
13
Congress made several attempts that did not become law. See Patent Reform
Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007); Patent
Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. (2006); Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R.
2795, 109th Cong. (2005).
14
The House passed its version of the Patent Reform Act of 2007. See H.R. 1908.
The Senate version of the 2007 Act, however, stalled in committee after senators disagreed on the method of awarding damages in patent infringement suits. Andrew
Noyes, Senators Close to Reintroducing Patent Overhaul Measure, CONGRESSDAILY, Jan. 30,
2009, http://www.nationaljournal.com/congressdaily/cdp_20090130_2218.php.
15
35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). Title 35 also permits injunctions as a patentinfringement remedy. § 283. Because the standard for an award of injunctive relief
for patent infringement has recently become higher and the area remains in flux, see
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391–94 (2006), injunctions as a pa-
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and the infringer’s gain or loss is not a factor. The damages remedy
is then broken down into two subcategories: lost profits and reasona17
ble royalties.
The second subcategory, reasonable royalties,
18
represents the minimum amount of a damages award.
The case for damages reform in the context of a larger patentreform package arises because of a perception that costs—litigation
costs and high damages awards—are excessive. In the realm of patent-infringement lawsuits, a number of parties, including industry
19
insiders and legal commentators, have expressed concern about the
20
cost of litigation and the amount of damages awards. In its most recent attempt to effectuate damages reform, Congress initially pro21
posed statutory damages apportionment in the 2009 Act. This effort
tent-infringement remedy merits detailed consideration largely beyond the scope of
this Comment.
16
Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir.
1978) (quoting Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 507
(1964)).
17
Id. (discussing lost profits); § 284 (discussing reasonable royalties).
18
§ 284 (stating that upon an infringement judgment, a court must award compensatory damages that are “in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use
made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by
the court”).
19
See, e.g., Patent Reform, supra note 1, at 5–8 (statement of Steven R. Appleton);
see also Coal. for Patent Fairness, Overview, http://www.patentfairness.org/learn/
about/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2009) (providing that Micron Technology, Inc. is a
company that belongs to the Coalition for Patent Fairness, a group comprised of
numerous companies in support of patent reform).
20
See, e.g., Christopher A. Harkins, Fending Off Paper Patents and Patent Trolls: A
Novel “Cold Fusion” Defense Because Changing Times Demand It, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH.
407, 434 (2007) (citing AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N (AIPLA), REPORT OF THE
ECONOMIC SURVEY (2005)) (“Patent litigation is outrageously expensive, driven in
part by the complexities of the technical and legal issues, uncertainties of claim
scope, and the amount at stake.”); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE
INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY: A
REPORT BY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ch. 1, at 20 n.135 (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (noting the argument that
“money damages have soared . . . both on average and in the highest-visibility cases”
since the Federal Circuit’s creation (quoting ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY,
PATENT LAW & POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 11 (3d ed. 2002))).
21
Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009) (as referred to S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009); Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th
Cong. (2009) (as referred to H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009). Senator
Kyl’s version would not mandate apportionment. Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 610,
111th Cong. (2009) (as referred to S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 17, 2009). This
Comment defines apportionment generally as “the requirement that a patentee’s
recovery be based on the economic value contributed by the patent.” Eric E. Bensen
& Danielle M. White, Using Apportionment to Rein in the Georgia-Pacific Factors, 9 COLUM.
SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 3 (2008), http://www.stlr.org/cite.cgi?volume=9&article=1
(citing Eric E. Bensen, Apportionment of Lost Profits in Contemporary Patent Damages Cas-
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mirrors a similar push to implement mandatory apportionment in
22
the Patent Reform Act of 2007 (2007 Act), which would have limited
courts’ and, consequently, juries’ discretion in reasonable royalty cal23
culations. Like the 2007 Act, the 2009 Act addresses an amended
24
form of the judicially created “entire market value” rule. This rule
applies when a patentee wants a damages award to incorporate the
value of a total product, whether or not the patent covers all components, and requires that the reason users sought the infringing prod25
uct within the market be the patented component.
The 2009 Act arrived on the heels of three previous attempts at
26
reform. The fact that Congress included the idea of damages apportionment in each of the previous reform bills indicates that a discussion of whether apportionment is indeed an appropriate response
27
is timely and necessary, though Congress has begun to recognize the
28
divisiveness of the idea. Although the House of Representatives version and the first Senate version of the 2009 Act suggest two other
methods of calculating a damages award—the entire-market-value

es, 10 VA. J.L. & TECH. 8 (2005), http://www.vjolt.net/vol10/issue3/v10i3_a8Bensen.pdf).
22
Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 5 (2007) (as passed by
House of Representatives, Sept. 7, 2007); Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th
Cong. § 5 (2007) (as referred to S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Apr. 18, 2007).
23
H.R. 1908 § 5; S. 1145 § 5.
24
Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. § 4(a) (2009) (adding 35
U.S.C. § 284(c)(1)(A)); Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. § 5(a)
(2009) (adding 35 U.S.C. § 284(c)(1)(A)). Senator Kyl’s version does not expressly
mention the entire-market-value rule. Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 610, 111th
Cong. § 4 (2009). But Senator Kyl’s version leaves room for its application by permitting consideration of any relevant factors in “determination of the amount of a
reasonable royalty” though consideration would take place in the context of a hypothetical license negotiation Id. § 4 (adding 35 U.S.C. § 284(b)–(c)).
25
Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1549–50 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc).
26
Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 5 (2007) (as passed by
House of Representatives, Sept. 7, 2007); Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th
Cong. § 5 (2007) (as referred to S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Apr. 18, 2007); Patent
Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. § 5 (2006) (wherein reasonable-royalty calculations involve consideration of “the economic value that should be attributed to
the novel and non-obvious feature or features of the invention, as distinguished from
the economic value attributable to other features”); Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R.
2795, 109th Cong. § 6 (2005) (stating that a reasonable royalty calculation for combination inventions shall involve consideration of, inter alia, “the portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the inventive contribution as distinguished
from other features of the combination”).
27
Id.
28
See supra note 9.
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rule and an “established royalty based on marketplace licensing” —
apportionment is still the standard under these proposals for “valuation calculation” if the patent owner cannot show either of these two
30
methods for calculating a damages award. Because a patentee will
not claim the entire market value of a product in every case and because an established royalty may not exist, apportionment would affect a sizeable number of damages awards if passed into law.
This Comment asserts that industry-specific patenting needs
demand retention of a fact-specific judicial approach to calculating
infringement damages. Any legislative changes, now or in the future,
should be minor and must avoid accommodating the requirements of
one industry over others. While a certain degree of limitation on
damages awards may be appropriate in a reform-minded climate, the
mandatory apportionment method is an ineffective, unfair means of
accomplishing this end. Any legislative reform should complement,
not supersede, the current approach, which relies on courts to calculate damages based on the facts of each case. This Comment outlines
how the courts have effectively accomplished this task by accommodating the existing patent laws to the needs of various industries’ inventions. This Comment also suggests how to preserve the industryaccommodating approach with legislation that is less divisive than
apportionment and explains why that course is preferable.
Legislatively mandated apportionment of damages is not the
proper approach for controlling damages awards primarily because
apportionment lends itself more readily to technology-based inven31
tions rather than chemical- or pharmaceutical-based inventions. Indeed, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary recognized the impropriety of apportionment after numerous meetings with
32
representatives of affected industries. If codified, compulsory apportionment would limit courts’ freedom to fashion remedies that reflect the diverse needs of the various industries that use the patent
system and that invoke the jurisdiction of the court for infringement
matters. Mandatory apportionment would replace the time-tested,
29

Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. § 4(a) (2009) (as referred to S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009) (adding 35 U.S.C. §§ 284(c)(1)(A)–(B)); Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. § 5(a) (2009) (as referred to H.R.
Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009) (adding 35 U.S.C. §§ 284(c)(1)(A)–(B)).
30
S. 515 § 4(a) (adding 35 U.S.C. § 284(c)(1)(C)); H.R. 1260 § 5(a) (adding 35
U.S.C. § 284(c)(1)(C)).
31
See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of
Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2330 (1994) (“Innovation in software development is typically incremental.”); see also infra Parts II.B., III.C.
32
See Condon, supra note 9; see also S. REP. NO. 111-18, at 9–10, 34–35 (2009).
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industry-specific analysis of the patented invention with an inflexible,
artificial contemplation of “the claimed invention’s specific contribu33
tion over the prior art.” If changes to the current approach are necessary, alternatives to the apportionment scheme exist. One alternative involves eliminating the statutory minimum award of a
reasonable royalty. This minor change could accompany a statutorydamages framework borrowed from copyright law but adapted to the
needs of patentees. This approach would, to a much greater extent
than apportionment, ensure a more consistent effect on all industries
using the patent system.
To illustrate these principles and suggestions, Part II outlines the
dimensions of the debate. Part II.A provides background information regarding the foundations and procedure of the U.S. patent system. Part II.B describes relevant characteristics of industry-scale users
of the patent system, the goals of those users, and the factors converging to prompt reform. Part III examines current statutes that minimize or obviate the need for additional reform, assesses current patentinfringement-damages jurisprudence, and suggests that formal, statutory deviation from this jurisprudence is unnecessary. This Part also
considers the impact of mandatory damages apportionment on the
various industries that use the patent system and provides normative
reasons why this course is unfavorable. Part IV introduces viable alternatives to apportionment as a means of addressing concerns about
the patent system. These alternatives complement the current judicial approach and include elimination of the reasonable-royalty floor
and imposition of a statutory-damages regime. In Part V, this Comment concludes by suggesting that, instead of attempting to assuage
the unilateral concerns of large technology companies by mandating
damages apportionment, Congress should continue to permit the
courts to craft invention- and industry-specific solutions to problems
that arise on a case-by-case basis. Continued industry-specific jurisprudence and modest legislative enactments will address the patenting needs of all users without favoring large technology companies at
the expense of the pharmaceutical industry.

33

Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. § 4(a) (2009) (as referred to S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009) (adding 35 U.S.C. § 284(c)(1)(C)); Patent
Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. § 5(a) (2009) (as referred to H.R.
Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009) (adding 35 U.S.C. § 284(c)(1)(C)).
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES PATENT SYSTEM AND
ITS INDUSTRY-SCALE USERS
A. The Basic Structure of United States Patent Law and its Damages
Provisions
The United States patent system is a massive force with humble
beginnings. The system wields enormous economic power and is
34
monetarily immense—”valued at more than $5 trillion” by one es35
timate. It also has major trade value for the United States. This important intellectual-property system derives from a simple constitutional grant of power to Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Disco36
veries.” Congress capitalized on its power by permitting inventors to
obtain patents on their creations so long as their patent applications
37
satisfy the remaining Title 35 requirements.
The patent system operates on a give-and-take principle. Underlying the system is a goal of encouraging and rewarding progress in
research and development by bestowing upon inventors a time38
limited, exclusive right of use and ownership of their inventions. In
exchange, the public receives a benefit in the form of an invention
disclosure, as well as access to the claimed technology when the pa39
tent terminates. This idea of an exchange has long been present in
40
patent jurisprudence. For example, the Supreme Court indicated
nearly two centuries ago that if the invention before the Court was already in the public domain or in the public’s “possession,” granting a
patent on the invention would provide “no quid pro quo—no price
34

Letter from Nathaniel F. Wienecke, Assistant Sec’y for Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs, to Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary (Feb. 4,
2008),
available
at
http://www.ogc.doc.gov/ogc/legreg/letters/110/
S1145020408.pdf.
35
See CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 2 (7th ed. 2006) (“The transfer of information has become an ever greater component of international trade and is the
centerpiece of U.S. competitiveness. Unlike other sectors of the economy, in the
area of intellectual property the United States is a net exporter—indeed, the world’s
larger exporter by far.”).
36
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
37
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (permitting the inventor of “any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof” to acquire a patent on it “subject to the conditions and requirements of this title”).
38
S. REP. NO. 110-259, at 2 (2008).
39
Id.
40
See generally Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1 (1829).
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for the exclusive right or monopoly conferred upon the inventor” for
41
the patent term.
As with other property rights, the patent monopoly connotes a
negative right. Patents do not confer an affirmative right to practice
the invention; they provide only a right to exclude others from doing
42
so.
The written patent document contains one or more claims,
which are carefully crafted sentences at the end of a patent document
that define the “metes and bounds of the patentee’s right to ex43
clude.” When an entity “makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells” an invention that embodies everything claimed in a patent without the
44
permission of the patentee, that entity infringes the patent. Even if
the actor does not personally perform every step of the claim, the actor may be liable for active inducement of infringement or contribu45
tory infringement as long as some entity somewhere is directly in46
fringing the patent.
After a court decides that a defendant infringed a patent, the
47
Section 284 of Title 35
damages provisions enter the picture.
“paints the criteria for the fixing of damages in broad strokes,” provided, however, that the awarded amount is at least a reasonable
48
royalty. Currently, courts may consider a multitude of factors and

41
42

Id. at 23.
The patent law, under 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1), reads as follows:
Contents. Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a
grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention
throughout the United States or importing the invention into the
United States, and, if the invention is a process, of the right to exclude
others from using, offering for sale or selling throughout the United
States, or importing into the United States, products made by that
process, referring to the specification for the particulars thereof.

Id.
43
F. SCOTT KIEFF ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 90 (4th
ed. 2008).
44
§ 271(a).
45
Id. § 271(b)–(c).
46
See, e.g., Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 341–
42 (1961) (stating that “there can be no contributory infringement” without direct
infringement); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 911 F.2d 670,
673 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citing Met-Coil Sys. Corp. v. Korners Unlimited., Inc., 803 F.2d
684, 687 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Standard Oil Co. v. Nippon Shokubai Kagaku Kogyo Co.,
754 F.2d 345, 348–49 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Aro Mfg. Co., 365 U.S. at 341) (stating that “a
finding of induced or contributory infringement must be predicated on a direct infringement”).
47
§ 284.
48
England v. Deere & Co., 221 F. Supp. 319, 322 (S.D. Ill. 1963).
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49

elements as each case warrants.
Two primary types of judicially
created damages awards have emerged in response to the liberal statutory framework for infringement damages. The first is the lostprofits measure, which depends on the patentee’s profits, ignores the
alleged infringer’s profits, and examines “(1) demand for the patented product, (2) absence of acceptable non-infringing substitutes,
(3) [the patentee’s] manufacturing and marketing capability to exploit the demand, and (4) the amount of the profit [the patentee]
50
would have made.”
Where unable to prove actual damages for calculation of lost
51
profits, the plaintiff’s second option is to seek reasonable royalties.
“A reasonable royalty is [the] amount” that a person who wants to use
the patented invention “would be willing to pay as a royalty and yet
be able to make and sell the patented article, in the market, at a rea52
sonable profit.” Typically, the operative calculus entails consideration of factors that “prudent businessmen” would consider in struc53
turing a “hypothetical license” involving the patented invention.
Interestingly, one factor explores “[t]he utility and advantages of the
patent property over the old modes or devices, if any, that had been
54
used for working out similar results.” Another factor is expert tes55
timony, common in the reasonable-royalty calculus. Traditionally,
reasonable royalties were the exceptional measure of damages while
56
lost profits were the mainstay. But reasonable royalties may have
overcome lost profits as the most common form of damages award
57
for infringement. This possibility underscores the significance of
legislative reform that aims to change the way reasonable royalties are
calculated.
Under either a lost-profits or a reasonable-royalty calculation, a
patentee can seek damages in the amount of the entire market value

49

Id.
Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir.
1978).
51
Id. at 1157.
52
Id. at 1157–58 (quoting Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Overman Cushion Tire
Co., 95 F.2d 978, 984 (6th Cir. 1937)).
53
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120–1121
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified on other grounds, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971).
54
Id. at 1120.
55
Id.
56
See S. REP. NO. 110-259, at 11 & n.42 (2008).
57
Id. at 11 n.42.
50
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of the infringing product or process. In entire-market-value analysis, a patentee suing for infringement on a product embodying his
claimed invention, along with unpatented components, must show
that the components or elements covered by the patent were the “ba59
sis for customer demand” of the purportedly infringing product. In
the absence of such a showing, the patentee’s infringement recovery
is proportionately lower.
B. The Characteristics, Goals, and Reform Perspectives of IndustryScale Users of the Patent System
Many diverse industries utilize the patent system. Two of the
60
most prominent industries are, first, the “Big Pharma sector,” which
for the purposes of this Comment encompasses major pharmaceutical, biological, and chemical companies, and, second, the “Big Tech
61
industries,” which include computer, software, and high-technology
entities. The companies in these two industries respectively produce
dissimilar inventions and have different reasons for using the patent
62
system. As a result, their interests place them on opposite sides of a
63
debate over patent reform, with technology companies advocating
for legislative limitations on damages awards and pharmaceutical
companies suggesting that limitations would be superfluous. This
Part provides a generalized sketch of the industries’ relevant characteristics.
The science-based, specifically pharmaceutical, disciplines are
generally pro-patent, given the nature of the typical invention and
the long journey to the market. A representative invention of the
chemical or pharmaceutical industry might be a pharmaceutical
drug, a genetic or proteomic fragment, or other chemical composi64
tion, and research tends to be cumulative rather than incremental.

58
See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1549–50 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc); State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
59
Rite-Hite Corp., 56 F.3d at 1549 (quoting State Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d at 1580;
TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 900–01 (Fed. Cir. 1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
60
Clarisa Long, Our Uniform Patent System, 55 FED. LAW. 44, 45 (2008) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
61
Id. at 44–46 (internal quotation marks omitted). These companies, such as
“Microsoft, Apple, Google, and Cisco,” support the proposed reform. Id. at 47.
62
See, e.g., Editorial, Patently Ridiculous, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2006, at A24.
63
Long, supra note 60, at 45.
64
See Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Invention in the Biopharmaceutical Industry:
The Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813, 815–16 (2001). There
may be some incremental invention in the pharmaceutical realm, but the benefits
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Major pharmaceutical companies are usually infringement plaintiffs
65
and often sue generic-drug makers. Some commentators suggest
that pharmaceutical patents are “more frequently litigated than pa66
tents in other industries and are often for entirely new products.”
Additionally, the pharmaceutical industry needs a highly effective pa67
tent system, as pharmaceutical inventions often take years and a
68
great deal of capital to develop. The patent system may even be essential to the continued vitality of major pharmaceutical companies’
69
research and development structure, which emphasizes patents as a
70
return on the research investment. Often, businesses and investors
71
need an incentive to undertake and fund scientific research, and patent law provides an opportunity for that incentive. Patents can provide a source of revenue through licensing or damages awards against
infringers.
The features of the large technology companies supporting
damages reform are very different from those of the pharmaceutical
72
industry. The technology-based invention may be “incremental,”
and inventions tend to be “new features and enhancements to exist73
ing products.” Because technological innovation tends to be incremental, a company might need access to a tremendous number of paappear less certain and “discrete innovation” seems to be dominant. See FED. TRADE
COMM’N, supra note 20, ch. 3, at 4–9, 14. Certainly, the types of inventions in the
pharmaceutical and technological industries may overlap to some extent, but broad
generalizations are drawn here to outline the boundaries of the patent reform debate.
65
Eric E. Williams, Note, Patent Reform: The Pharmaceutical Industry Prescription for
Post-Grant Opposition and Remedies, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 354, 364–65
(2008).
66
John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the United States Patent System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77, 137 (2002).
67
John Markoff, Two Views of Innovation Colliding in Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
13, 2008, § 3, at 3.
68
See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Jeff Gerth, In a Drug’s Journey to Market, Discovery is
Just the First of Many Steps, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2000, § 1, at 15.
69
Long, supra note 60, at 45 (“Pharmaceutical research is a high-cost, highly uncertain process, with a final product that is cheap to reverse engineer, copy, and mass
produce.”); see also Patent Reform, supra note 1, at 6 (statement of Philip S. Johnson).
70
See Stolberg & Gerth, supra note 68; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 20,
ch.2, at 1; ch. 3, at 1, 4–9, 14.
71
Matthew T. Latimer, Patenting Inventions Arising from Biological Research, 6
GENOME BIOLOGY 203.1, 203.2–.3 (2004), available at http://genomebiology.com/
2004/6/1/203.
72
Samuelson et al., supra note 31, at 2330; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note
20, Executive Summary, at 6; ch. 2, at 25–26.
73
Eric E. Bensen, Commentary, Patent Reform Act of 2007, 2008 EMERGING ISSUES
529, at 5.
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tented products for the creation of just one product. If a patentee
sues the company for infringement on the basis of that one product,
the allegedly infringed patent may relate to a minor aspect of the de75
vice. The holder of a patent purportedly covering that minor part
of the product can effectively force the technology company to pay
any demanded royalty by holding “hostage” the production of the
76
device with infringement charges. As a result, technology companies are “increasingly finding that the nation’s patent system has become a minefield,” and these companies want to “limit the leverage”
77
The
of independent patent-holding inventors and patent trolls.
companies may therefore seek broad patent protection on as much as
they can to avoid possible infringement or licensing fees at a later
78
date. This tactic, known as defensive patenting, tends to create a
79
80
“patent thicket,” which may function as an obstacle to innovation.
For the major market players in the technology sector, the patent system may hamper, rather than spur, innovation. Many big
technology companies may dismiss the patent system as overly constrictive because the companies instead can emphasize, for example,
“market power and cross-licensing relationships” to advance devel81
opment. Cross-licensing power provides companies an alternative
82
means of invention valuation. The importance of licensing as an incentive also undermines the notion that litigation is too common in
the large technology sector. Indeed, despite the fierce push for
74

See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 20, Executive Summary, at 6; ch. 3, at 30.
Long, supra note 60, at 45.
76
Id. at 46.
77
Markoff, supra note 67, § 3, at 3. For a discussion of “patent trolls,” see infra
notes 98–109 and accompanying text.
78
See, e.g., Bensen, supra note 73, at 5; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 20,
Executive Summary, at 6; ch. 2, at 26.
79
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 20, Executive Summary, at 6 & n.20 (describing
a patent thicket as a “dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a
company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology” (quoting Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools,
and Standard-Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 120 (Adam Jaffe
et al. eds., 2001))).
80
Id. at 6–7.
81
Markoff, supra note 67, § 3, at 3; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 20, ch.
2, at 2 (suggesting the decreased importance of patents in “the semiconductor and
communications industries”).
82
Long, supra note 60, at 45 (“Many technological sectors do not primarily rely
on patents in order to capture the value of their inventions. Instead, they use patents
defensively or as assets to bring to the table in a cross-licensing negotiation.”); see also
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 20, ch. 3, at 32–33 (discussing trade secrecy); ch. 3, at
31, 43, 44, 46, 56 (noting the role of competition).
75
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reform deriving from the technology sector, empirical research suggests that litigation is actually less frequent in technology-focused in84
dustries, where “royalty-free cross-licensing” is quite common.
For technology companies already uncomfortable with the patent system’s constraints, the relative ambiguity of the current damages provision is an additional problem that needs to be addressed in
legislative reform. The current statute leaves the standards for a reasonable royalty to the courts, as they are not specified in the law it85
self. Technology companies claim that this framework leads to ex86
orbitant damage awards.
As may be evident from the above discussion, the divergent
perspectives of pharmaceutical and large technology companies on
the utility of patent protection lead to opposing views on the need for
reform and on what shape such reform should take. Some suggest
that patent reform incorporating damages apportionment favors ma87
jor technology-based industries and their representative inventions.
According to some commentators, patent reform addresses the complaints of “large information technology . . . companies seeking to
88
reduce their exposure to patent trolls.” While mandatory appor-

83

See supra note 1 and accompanying text. Because empirical research seems to
favor both sides of this debate, this Comment assumes for the sake of argument that
technology companies do indeed face obstacles meriting a discussion of reform.
84
Allison & Lemley, supra note 66, at 140 (identifying specifically the “semiconductor and electronics industries”).
85
See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006); see also Dennis Crouch, Patent Reform 2009: Damages,
PATENTLY-O, Mar. 3 2009, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/03/patentreform-2009-damages.html (“The current damages statute gives little guidance to a
court.”).
86
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
87
See, e.g., Long, supra note 60, at 46–47; see also Dennis Crouch, Patent Reform Act
of 2009, PATENTLY-O, Mar. 3, 2009, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/03/
patent-reform-act-of-2009.html (stating that “it is clear that this is not ‘balanced’
reform” and that the damages changes will likely “reduce patent awards”).
88
Robert E. Thomas, Vanquishing Copyright Pirates and Patent Trolls: The Divergent
Evolution of Copyright and Patent Laws, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 689, 692 (2006). As a counterpart to these technology companies, the author cites the opposition to reform
lodged by “[l]arge biotechnology, medical, and pharmaceutical companies” that do
not encounter patent troll problems as frequently. Id. at 693; see also Markoff, supra
note 67 (“It appears that the Senate leadership has sympathy for the large technology companies.”). Research indicates, however, that the large damages awards with
which technology companies take issue may be less problematic than the industry
suggests. See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An
Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L.
REV. 237, 278 (2006) (suggesting that a relatively small number of infringement verdicts result and with correspondingly few damage awards); see also David W. Opderbeck, Patent Damages and the Shape of Patent Law, 89 B.U. L. REV. 127, 137–50 (2009)
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tionment may improve the technology industry’s litigation position,
pharmaceutical companies could often find themselves in a comparatively disadvantageous situation, whether they are plaintiffs or defendants in an infringement suit. Whereas a technological invention
might contribute to the existing art because, for example, a computer
component increases memory by a certain tangible percentage or
processing speed by some calculable margin, a pharmaceutical or
chemical invention may not offer any immediately measurable improvement in patient outcomes.
Given these differences, it would be much easier to conduct apportionment within infringement suits involving technology patents
89
because the “specific contribution over the prior art” could, in many
instances, be empirically determinable. Relative ease of computation
could be extraordinarily important in the damages phase of patent
litigation, where a lay jury is deciding on an amount to award a patentee. In contrast, the pharmaceutical or chemical invention’s benefit
may be intangible, or alternatively, may not be fully evident at the
moment of the invention but could culminate later in an important
90
medical or clinical discovery. Apportionment ignores the multitude
of possibilities for pharmaceutical inventions by suggesting a “back91
wards-looking” stance, where a “forward looking view” would more
92
readily accommodate these characteristics.
The difference in the timing and tangibility of benefits is not the
only basis for contrast between pharmaceutical and technological inventions. If a juror can conceptually break an invention down into its
component parts, then the invention lends itself well to apportionment of damages. In effect, a juror may find it easier to affix a value
to parts that can actually be separated than to parts that form a cohesive whole. Technology-based inventions are, as a general matter,
more amenable to theoretical division into discrete components than
are pharmaceutical- or chemical-based inventions. For example, one
commentator discussed a computer-aided method that requires input
(collecting and analyzing the results of previous statistical damages awards studies,
conducting an original study, and concluding that no trend toward excessive damages emerges).
89
Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. § 4(a) (2009) (as referred to S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009); Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th
Cong. § 5(a) (2009) (as referred to H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009).
90
See Opderbeck, supra note 88, at 167 (indicating that the contribution of a discovery or invention over prior art may be modest at the time of discovery but could
result in a drastic difference years later).
91
Id.
92
Id.
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93

of genes to assess lifestyle-risk factors. The degree of the method’s
utility depends on the number of gene fragments the program can
94
access and on the particular function each gene performs. Presumably, the biological significance of the encoded protein determines
95
the program’s ultimate usefulness and success. Changing the facts
for the moment to imagine that this invention was an actual, physical
computer, rather than an algorithm, provides an interesting scenario
for examining the differences between technological and biological
or pharmaceutical inventions.
Potential infringement issues related to the hypothetical computer illustrate the nature of technological inventions as generally divisible and of scientific inventions as frequently cohesive or indivisible. If the patent at issue in an infringement suit involving a
computer-covered monitor with increased pixel density, market studies and statistical analysis could help pinpoint the new feature attracting the customer to the product. In this way, the claimed invention’s “specific contribution over the prior art” could be
96
determined. The situation would be very different if the patent described a gene fragment that codes for the first ten amino acids of a
97
protein linked to a particular medical condition. If the allegedly infringing product included a gene fragment coding for the second ten
amino acids of the same protein, market studies or statistical analysis
would not assist in isolating the protein’s consumer-attractive feature.
No rational way is available to determine whether the purportedly infringed patent improved over existing art and to what, if any, degree.
In their push for damages reform, large technology companies
often cite a “significant cottage industry” of non-manufacturing and
non-practicing entities purchasing patents and asserting the inherent

93
See David Castle, Intellectual Property and Nutrigenomics, 16 HEALTH L. REV. 58, 60
(2008),
available
at
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb1366/is_3_16/
ai_n29427283/pg_1?tag=artBody;col1.
94
Id.
95
See id.
96
Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. § 4(a) (2009) (as referred to S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009) (adding 35 U.S.C. § 284(c)(1)(C)); Patent
Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. § 5(a) (2009) (as referred to H.R.
Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009) (adding 35 U.S.C. § 284(c)(1)(C)).
97
Proteins carry out numerous vital processes in organisms, such as catalyzing
biological reactions and carrying out molecular transport. See JEREMY M. BERG ET AL.,
BIOCHEMISTRY 41–42 (5th ed. 2002). Proteins are built from various compositions of
amino acids, and in turn, genes determine the amino acid sequences. Id. at 43–53.
It follows that, while amino acids are individually important, the entirety of the
grouping determines the function of the protein.
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98

rights. The entities often work with patents whose inventors or as99
signees would not or could not practice the claimed invention.
They are dubbed “patent trolls” and exist solely to enforce otherwise
100
insignificant patents and patents of questionable validity. Thus, patent trolls artificially increase transaction and litigation costs for both
users and non-users of the patent system.
The profile of patent trolls arose in recent years after protracted
litigation involving Research in Motion, the maker of BlackBerry de101
vices.
A patent-holding company, NTP, sued Research in Motion
for infringing patents that covered parts of the e-mail technology that
102
Research in Motion purportedly used in BlackBerry devices. A jury
found that Research in Motion had infringed the patents, and the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit partially affirmed the
103
infringement verdict.
The parties continued negotiations and
104
eventually settled, as NTP possibly could have obtained an injunction against all distribution and use of BlackBerry products after the
infringement verdict in its favor. Given the incremental nature of
technology patents, situations such as the one in the BlackBerry case
can arise whereby a non-practicing entity can threaten to shut down
an entire system based on an allegedly infringed patent covering only
105
a minor aspect of the overall product.
Even where the litigation
ends in a settlement, rather than a damages award, the settlement
106
amount can be massive. Large technology companies with successful but intricate products observe these types of cases and demand
patent reform in general and apportionment in particular.

98

Harkins, supra note 20, at 410.
Id.
100
Id. at 410–11 (citing Steve Seidenberg, Troll Control, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2006, at 51,
53; Raymond P. Niro & Paul K. Vickrey, The Patent Troll Myth, 7 SEDONA CONF. J. 153,
153 (2006)) (internal quotations omitted).
101
NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
102
Id. at 1290.
103
Id. at 1291–92, 1325–26; see also Matthew J. May, Comment, Patent Reform, Injunctions, and Equitable Principles: A Triangle of Changes for the Future, 6 J. MARSHALL
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 671, 676 (2007).
104
May, supra note 103, at 676.
105
This idea of product holdup underlies the technology industry’s concerns. See,
e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 20, Executive Summary, at 7 (stating that a
“questionable patent . . . may be asserted to hold up production of [an] entire software program”).
106
See Ian Austen, BlackBerry Service to Continue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2006, at C1.
The case was settled for $612.5 million. Id.
99
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While many commentators have lamented the role of patent
trolls, others have argued that they serve a useful function. These
“patent dealers” may act “as a market intermediary in the patent
market” and thereby provide “liquidity, market clearing, and in107
creased efficiency to the patent markets.” Regardless of which view
is proper, noting that entities are technically completely within their
rights under the patent laws to purchase patents and enforce them
108
without ever practicing the invention is important.
Any reforms
that purport to target non-practicing entities must be sensitive not
only to their potentially beneficial purposes but also to the fact that
109
they are within the letter of the law regarding patent protection.
Apportionment of damages may be one way to target the economic
incentives behind the much-maligned patent troll issue, but given the
negative consequences on other industries, apportionment cannot be
the best or only solution.
The tension between pharmaceutical and technology companies
110
resulting from their differing uses of patenting, the perceived
111
threat of increasing damage awards and patent trolls, and congressional recognition of these converging factors have culminated in
several recent legislative proposals for patent reform, including the
112
notion of damages apportionment.
The legislation will not likely
107

James F. McDonough III, Comment, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative
View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 190, 201
(2006) (referencing DAVID L. SCOTT, WALL STREET WORDS: AN A TO Z GUIDE TO
INVESTMENT TERMS FOR TODAY’S INVESTOR 87 (3d ed. 2003)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The author’s thesis, at least in part, rests on the idea that smallentity or individual inventors do not have the capital to force litigation and thus cannot effectively enforce their patents. Id. at 210. Non-practicing entities, whether
deemed trolls or dealers, have more financial liquidity with which to fund a lawsuit,
which would theoretically prompt more licensing by potential infringers in lieu of an
approach that involves infringing the patent and handling litigation if it arises. See
id. at 210–11.
108
See Wesley Jessen Corp. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 209 F. Supp. 2d 348, 403 n.12
(D. Del. 2002), injunction modified, 235 F. Supp. 2d 370 (D. Del. 2002), aff’d, 56 Fed.
Appx. 503 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (stating that “a patentee need not commercialize his invention to successfully sue for patent infringement, and . . . a patent at its core is the
right to exclude”).
109
The issue of the utility vel non of non-practicing, patent-holding entities, or
patent trolls, is a broad one. The dimensions of the problem are outlined merely to
illustrate one of the industry-specific factors prompting patent reform and to indicate how alleviating this problem accords with the proposed reform alternatives embodied herein.
110
See supra notes 60–86 and accompanying text.
111
See Harkins, supra note 20; see also supra notes 98–109 and accompanying text.
112
See Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. § 4(a) (2009) (as referred
to S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009) (adding 35 U.S.C. § 284(c)(1)(C)); Pa-
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bring this heated debate to an end. Regardless of whether damages
apportionment becomes law (in this or a future round of patent
reform legislation), pharmaceutical-minded and large technologyfocused companies will continue to have vastly different uses and
goals for the patent system. The patent system needs a measured legislative approach that keeps flexible jurisprudence intact while reasonably addressing the needs of the technology sector. This result
will preserve the value of the system as a whole through that industry’s continued use without significantly altering the necessary incentives for pharmaceutical companies.
III. OPERATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS, CURRENT DAMAGES
JURISPRUDENCE, AND THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF REFORM UPON
PATENT SYSTEM USERS
A. Statutory Provisions Negating the Need for Legislatively Mandated
Damages Apportionment
Current patent law is sufficiently flexible to provide the result
that large technology companies seek. The law already addresses, in
113
a technology-neutral way and during the examination phase, the
need for claimed inventions to be different from and perhaps even
better than prior art. Thus, additional checks at the damages phase
114
are superfluous. For example, the nonobviousness requirement for
obtaining a patent mandates consideration of the claimed invention
115
in light of the existing art in the relevant subject area. The invention must satisfy a standard of being different from what others have

tent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. § 5(a) (2009) (as referred to H.R.
Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009) (adding 35 U.S.C. § 284(c)(1)(C)); Patent
Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 5 (2007) (as passed by House of Representatives, Sept. 7, 2007); Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 5
(2007) (as referred to S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Apr. 18, 2007); Patent Reform Act
of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. § 5 (2006); Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795,
109th Cong. § 6 (2005).
113
A patent is a government-granted privilege, and the United States Patent and
Trademark Office scrutinizes each patent application, a process called examination,
for compliance with the applicable statutory requirements. See KIEFF ET AL., supra
note 43, at 72.
114
This additional check would be the “specific contribution over the prior art”
language in certain versions of the 2009 Act or similar wording effectively mandating
damages apportionment.
See, e.g., H.R. 1260 § 5(a) (adding 35 U.S.C. §
284(c)(1)(C)).
115
35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006); see also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 3 (1966);
infra notes 155–64 and accompanying text.
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done previously to receive the benefit of the patent monopoly. The
relevance of provisions such as 35 U.S.C. § 103 lies not only in ensuring thorough consideration of a claimed invention against what already exists in the field, but in carrying out this analysis long before
questions of infringement and damages arise. When the Patent and
Trademark Office issues a patent, it has already given its stamp of approval that the claimed invention has made a contribution over the
prior art in a given field because the invention would not be obvious
117
to one of ordinary skill in that art.
The utility requirement is another example of how current patent statutes already incorporate the result for which large technology
companies advocate. If a patent is granted, the United States Patent
and Trademark Office has determined that the invention satisfies a
major patentability requirement in 35 U.S.C. § 101, which permits an
applicant to obtain a patent only on a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
118
119
From the statutory language of “useful,”
improvement thereof.”
120
courts have derived a theme of “technological benefit.” This bene121
fit has to “exist[] in [a] currently available form.” While one reading of these decisions suggests that the courts simply meant to pre122
vent patents on impossible inventions, another interpretation posits
that the utility requirement is not met if the public does not receive
123
an actual benefit from an invention. If the pertinent field of art is
116

The particular formulation of the obviousness rule of law has changed in important ways over the life of the patent system. See infra notes 154–64 and accompanying text. But a lasting statement of the rule is found in Graham, 383 U.S. at 17.
117
35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
118
§ 101.
119
Id.
120
JOYCE ET AL., supra note 35, at 7 (discussing differences between copyright law
and patent law).
121
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 535 (1966); see also In re Fisher, 421 F.3d
1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding that a claimed invention has to have a “significant and presently available benefit to the public” and a “well-defined and particular
benefit to the public”).
122
See, e.g., In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 863–64 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (affirming that cold fusion does not satisfy the utility requirement).
123
See, e.g., Nelson v. Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 856 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (“‘Practical utility’
is a shorthand way of attributing ‘real-world’ value to claimed subject matter. In other words, one skilled in the art can use a claimed discovery in a manner which provides some immediate benefit to the public.”). Although the Nelson case decided an
interference appeal, id. at 854–55, the court’s rationale can be logically applied in
the context of this discussion. Indeed, this interpretation of the utility requirement
dates back more than a century. See KIEFF ET AL., supra note 43, at 740 (stating that,
for an invention to be patentable, it need not only “be bestowed upon the public by
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crowded and a consumer could simply use another product or component that works in essentially the same way, an invention has not
bestowed a benefit on that consumer. The consumer may have addi124
tional choices but no new benefit in a technological sense.
Under this reading of the statute and interpretive case law, the
utility requirement functions as an examination-stage screening mechanism that allows inventions to be patented only if they have contributed a benefit to the existing subject matter. Even under the narrower reading of the utility requirement, in which an invention does
not have to explicitly improve on the existing art to be patentable
125
and an inventor is “rewarded for disclosing something new,” if not
necessarily better, the provision still permits consideration of benefits
long before the damages phase. If the patent system does not render
a dispositive judgment about benefits to the public, members of the
126
latter group will decide on their own.
Regardless of whether the
patent examining system or the general public rules on an invention’s beneficial utility, the damages provisions ideally play no important role in the decision.
The nonobviousness and utility requirements suggest that all inventions, whether pharmaceutical or technological, must add something to the art or at least provide something different from what already exists. If an invention fails to reach this threshold, it cannot
attain the rights and privileges associated with a patent. Because statutory mechanisms that address the concerns of major technology
companies already exist, Congress need not add an additional requirement of the same character in the damages section of Title 35.
The nonobviousness and utility provisions already establish a statutory framework that allows, initially, the patent office to screen inven-

its inventor” but also must “confer on [the public] a benefit” (quoting 1 WILLIAM
ROBINSON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS 462–63 (1890))).
124
The consumer may benefit from a lower price by virtue of greater competition,
but such issues are more properly the province of antitrust law. Additionally, the
proposed damages provisions would consider the availability of “similar noninfringing substitutes in the relevant market” that have been “the subject of . . . nonexclusive licenses” in determining whether a particular established royalty amount is applicable to the determination of a damages award. See Patent Reform Act of 2009, S.
515, 111th Cong. § 4(a) (2009) (as referred to S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3,
2009) (adding 35 U.S.C. § 284(c)(1)(B)); Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260 §
5(a) (2009) (as referred to H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009) (adding 35
U.S.C. § 284 (c)(1)(B)). This language is superfluous, however, because that process
is already judicially ingrained. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
125
Opderbeck, supra note 88, at 166.
126
Id. (citing Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No.
8568)).
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tions for benefits and, subsequently, the courts to fashion appropriate
remedies for the specific inventions in suit, regardless of technological pedigree.
B. Patent Jurisprudence: Effective in its Current State
When calculating infringement damages, courts presently have
the freedom to consider the particular characteristics of the patented
invention, whether the invention is classified as pharmaceutical, bio127
logical, chemical, technological, mechanical, or otherwise.
With
128
the capacity to be flexible under the current damages statute,
courts can accommodate the needs of the industries and have often
done so. The Federal Circuit has recognized that a damages calcula129
tion is hardly a one-size-fits-all endeavor, even within industries, and
that classes of inventions require special treatment in other ways. For
example, the Federal Circuit can and does uniquely apply particular
statutory requirements, such as the utility requirement and the best130
mode requirement, for obtaining patents in different ways for different types of inventions. It is especially compelling that statistical
evidence may support the notion of “courts . . . deciding cases indivi131
dually on the merits.”
132
Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co. highlights one situation
in which a general patenting principle was adapted to meet the de133
mands of the specific chemical invention in suit. The case involved
erythropoietin (EPO), a protein that is used to “stimulate[] the pro-

127
The courts currently possess this broad discretion because the statute compelling an award of damages for patent infringement does not single out, expressly or by
implication, any type of invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
128
Id.
129
See, e.g., Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 527 F.3d 1359, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(“We have never held that any one profit accounting methodology is appropriate in
all industries, for all companies, in all cases. The selection of the appropriate method of profit accounting in the circumstances is properly left to the broad discretion
of the district court.”), mandate recalled and remanded with instructions to District Court on
allowance of interest, 557 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also id. at 1366 (“The correct
measure of damages is a highly case-specific and fact-specific analysis.”).
130
35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 112 (2006); see Northern Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
215 F.3d 1281, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting that, in a case involving a treatment for
semiconductors, whether the best-mode requirement is satisfied depends on the
threshold question of the “defin[ition] [of] the invention at hand”). See generally In
re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (imposing an industry-specific standard for
utility requirement’s application to chemical inventions).
131
Opderbeck, supra note 88, at 137.
132
927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
133
Id.
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duction of red blood cells” and that is useful in treating blood dis134
orders, including anemia. Whereas the preparation of the protein
historically relied on purification from human urine, a technique
eliminating this need was developed in the form of EPO produced
from recombinant DNA containing the gene encoding the EPO pro135
tein.
The recombinant DNA is used in conjunction with cell cul136
tures “containing the EPO gene.” Amgen obtained a patent on the
137
isolated EPO-coding DNA sequences and accompanying host cells.
The defendant in Amgen, Genetics Institute, owned another patent
with similar subject matter that claimed, inter alia, “homogenous EPO
138
and compositions thereof.”
Amgen sued Genetics Institute and
Chugai for alleged infringement of the Amgen patent based partly on
the defendants’ use of recombinant DNA and vector-containing host
139
cells. Invalidity issues arose as to several of the patents in suit and
required determination of which inventor first conceived the inven140
tion. After stating the general test for conception—that it “requires
both the idea of the invention’s structure and possession of an opera141
tive method of making it” —the court recognized a more specific

134

Id. at 1203.
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id. at 1203–04.
138
Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1203.
139
Id. at 1204. Chugai is named in the suit because it is the exclusive licensee of
this Genetics Institute patent. See Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1737, 1738 (D. Mass. 1989), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, vacated in part, Amgen,
927 F.2d 1200.
140
Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1204–07. The conception date is important because under
35 U.S.C. § 102(g), a person can obtain a patent on an invention, assuming that all
other patentability requirements are met, only if that invention was not already done
before by someone else; therefore, inventors trying to obtain a patent or to prove in
an infringement suit that their invention came first will try to push back the invention date as much as possible. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2006). That antedating is
made possible by the following provision:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
....
(g)(2) before such person’s invention thereof, the invention was made
in this country by another inventor who had not abandoned, suppressed or concealed it. In determining priority of invention under this
subsection, there shall be considered not only the respective dates of
conception and reduction to practice of the invention, but also the
reasonable diligence of one who was first to conceive and last to reduce
to practice, from a time prior to conception by the other.
Id.
141
Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1206 (citing Oka v. Youssefyeh, 849 F.2d 581, 583 (Fed. Cir.
1988)).
135
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test for chemical compounds. According to the court, a gene qualifies as a chemical compound, and conception of that gene involves
the inventor being able to define the compound “so as to distinguish
142
it from other materials, and to describe how to obtain it.” If an inventor cannot “envision the detailed constitution of a gene so as to
distinguish it from other materials, as well as a method for obtaining
143
it,” conception only occurs upon reduction to practice. The court’s
test is flexible enough to permit recognition, in other cases and with
regard to other inventions, of the difference between isolating a
compound and creating or assembling the compound as in mechani144
cal inventions.
Given the court’s careful and technology-specific
145
analysis in Amgen, courts can reasonably and, in fact, do capably address unique industry needs in the context of damages calculations.
Importantly, courts have already incorporated the principle underlying the proposed apportionment approach where appropriate.
Legislatively mandated apportionment becomes unnecessary as a result. For example, in claim construction, a broader claim scope may
146
be afforded to “pioneering inventions,” apparently because of an
absence of limiting prior art. By implication, an invention that adds
little to a field will have a smaller range of equivalents and corres147
pondingly smaller claim scope.
Thus, the court will consider any
conceivable contribution to the art in determining the range of equivalents and whether infringement occurred at all. If a court does not
find an independent contribution of a component in a technology
combination patent, presuming that the court would fix a narrow
142

Id. (citing Oka, 849 F.2d at 583).
Id.
144
This difference perhaps results from the fact that with many biological or
chemical inventions, the result and techniques may be completely new and not
known among other practitioners in the field. Therefore, a simple description of the
predicted end result is insufficient. See Oka, 849 F.2d at 583 (stating that, usually, description is enough when conventional methods in the field are used because “the
question of whether the conceiver was in possession of a method of making it is simply not raised”).
145
See generally Amgen, 927 F.2d 1200.
146
Augustine Med., Inc. v. Gaymar Indus., 181 F.3d 1291, 1301–02 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (citing Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1532
(Fed. Cir. 1987); Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Litton Sys., Inc., 720 F.2d 1572, 1579 (Fed.
Cir. 1983)).
147
The doctrine of equivalents is explained and developed in a long line of precedents; it typically broadens the scope of claims beyond their literal language. See,
e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002);
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997). A “liberal
range of equivalents” would further expand that scope. Northwest Engineering
Corp. v. Keystone Driller Co., 70 F.2d 13, 15 (7th Cir. 1934).
143
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range of equivalents is reasonable and thus makes a finding of in148
fringement less likely before the damages phase is even reached. If
there is no infringement, no damages award can be made, and the
goal of controlling such awards is ultimately met without resort to a
mandatory-apportionment analysis.
The court’s subtle incorporation of the principles underlying
apportionment in the context of claim construction is important be149
cause claim construction is a vital step in any infringement analysis.
This process has necessarily come to incorporate the nuances of the
art embodied in vast numbers and types of inventions. Notably, because the technology sector is particularly concerned with ensuring
that apportionment happens in cases involving its patents, courts implicitly examine an invention’s contribution over prior art in determining claim scope.
In addition to effectively performing apportionment where appropriate during claim construction, courts already have the opportunity to use apportionment during a patent-infringement damages
150
151
calculation. The seminal Georgia-Pacific case, listing the hypothetical license factors useful to courts in fashioning damages awards,
suggests that “[t]he utility and advantages of the patent property over
the old modes or devices, if any, that had been used for working out

148
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit may have accomplished the
same result with language more closely mirroring the legislative proposal. That
court suggested that determining “the place of the invention in the art and the extent
of its contribution over the prior art” is of fundamental significance in claim construction. Northwest Engineering Corp., 70 F.2d at 15–16 (quoting Johnson Bros. Engineering Corp. v. Masters, 49 F.2d 187, 190 (7th Cir. 1931)) (emphasis added). The court
suggested that “[i]f the patent covers an invention of much merit—marks a long step
upward over the prior art—then neither the specifications nor the claims should be
read literally.” Id. (quoting Johnson Bros. Engineering Corp., 49 F.2d at 190). This
precedent, however, does not bind the current appellate arbiter of patent suits, the
Federal Circuit.
149
5A DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 18.03 (perm. ed., rev. 2007) (“Determination of infringement of a patent requires construction of the meaning of the
patent’s claim (or claims) and then application of the claim as construed to the accused product or process.”).
150
See, e.g., Lucent Tech., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1332–33 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (noting, in the context of a discussion of the court’s reasons for vacating a
damages award, that “the infringing feature . . . is but a tiny feature of one part of a
much larger software program” and concluding that “the infringing use of Outlook’s
date-picker feature is a minor aspect of a much larger software program and . . . the
portion of the profit that can be credited to the infringing use of the date-picker tool
is exceedingly small”); see also id. at 1336–38 (discussing the entire market value
rule).
151
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), modified but method of calculating damages aff’d, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971).
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152

similar results” are relevant.
While attempts to codify this factor
would aim to promote certainty and uniformity of damages awards,
the option to rely upon it has been available to courts and litigants
for over thirty years. If courts have used other factors instead, the
particular invention in front of each court may simply warrant a different set of considerations; the court or jury need not have intended
153
solely to grant a large damages award.
An equally significant element of patent jurisprudence meriting
retention of the current approach involves the continual self154
adjustment of the patent system. A brief history of the nonobvious155
ness requirement is instructive in this regard. In 1941, the Supreme
Court indicated that a “flash of creative genius,” an arguably high
156
threshold, served as a patentability requirement.
The standard
then evolved to require that an invention be somehow greater than
157
158
the “sum of its parts.”
Later, in Graham, the Supreme Court expanded on the legislative requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 103 and enunciated a three-part test for obviousness inquiries that compares the
159
prior art in a given field to the claims of a patent. The Graham test
also provided for assessment of other, somewhat subsidiary, consider160
ations.
When the patent system had arguably become too lax re161
garding the nonobviousness requirement, the Supreme Court’s de162
cision in KSR conceivably circulated back in the direction of stricter
patenting standards by raising the possibility that more patents would

152

Georgia-Pacific Corp., 318 F. Supp. at 1120.
See Crouch, supra note 83 (stating that, because certain courts already carry out
functions like considering an invention’s contribution, “legislation advocates may
refer to the damages reforms as simply a clarification that limits the actions of rogue
courts”).
154
See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text.
155
KIEFF ET AL., supra note 43, at 531–36, contains a useful overview of the history
of the nonobviousness provision. This Comment highlights the major elements of
this overview to indicate the section’s progression.
156
Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941).
157
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152
(1950).
158
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
159
Id. at 17 (explaining that nonobviousness analysis involves determining “the
scope and content of the prior art . . . [the] differences between the prior art and the
claims at issue . . . and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art”).
160
Id. at 17–18. These considerations include “commercial success, long felt but
unresolved needs, [and] failure of others.” Id. at 17.
161
See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 20, ch. 4, at 8, 11–12.
162
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
153
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163

be deemed invalid for obviousness, though the lasting effects of the
decision remain to be seen. In response, the lower courts have interpreted the Supreme Court’s pronouncement to recommend precise164
ly that course of action. This jurisprudential intervention, whether
or not intended as a statement about the proper boundaries of the
patent system, functionally accomplishes precisely that result by ruling on the implementation of a particular aspect of that system.
The evolution of the nonobviousness requirement indicates that
165
courts remain alert to the dynamics of the patent system.
If one
area has become unwieldy and threatens the credibility of the larger
system, the courts are fully capable of shifting the focus to accommodate industry users’ perceived needs without drastic legislative inter166
vention.
The argument applies with equal force to damages
reform. Concerns about damages awards are best addressed by the
courts because courts are the most institutionally competent bodies
to produce results that accommodate the ever-changing needs of entities in the business of developing new products and technologies.
A counterargument to retaining the current approach might
167
point to accusations of an “anticommons” effect. According to this
theory, “important patented upstream technologies will be underused” because multiple patents on that subject matter will act as a
168
disincentive to other inventors.
These inventors will be averse to
169
navigating what may be a complex web of license negotiations. The
phenomenon is said to be especially significant in the biotechnology
170
sector, which is alarming because of the perceived impact on innovation in important areas of science and medicine. A hypothetical
argument might posit that if the system tolerates an anticommons ef163
The Supreme Court, in holding that the TSM test is a “helpful insight” but is
not the exclusive means of proving obviousness and thus negating validity, implicitly
suggested that more avenues would be considered viable ways of invalidating patents
on obviousness grounds. Id. at 418–19.
164
See, e.g., Ball Aerosol v. Ltd. Brands, 555 F.3d 984, 991 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (applying KSR, 550 U.S. at 420–21, in finding claims in suit to be obvious).
165
See supra notes 155–64 and accompanying text.
166
Obviousness is not the only example of this judicial self-regulation. Recently,
the Federal Circuit presumably imposed a measure of limitation on the scope of patentable subject matter in the context of method claims. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d
943, 949, 951, 954, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2735
(2009).
167
Yann Joly, Open Source Approaches in Biotechnology: Utopia Revisited, 59 ME. L. REV.
385, 394 (2007).
168
Id. at 395.
169
Id.
170
Id.
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fect that suppresses innovation, its fundamental premises need greater oversight in the form of legislation. Damages would fall into the
category of fundamental because they are a significant remedy under
the patent laws.
But empirical research simply does not support the anticom171
mons notion.
The much-hyped phenomenon apparently has not
172
affected biomedical research.
While there may certainly be a potential for problems to arise, an open source or shared usage paradigm borrowed from the information-technology world is beginning
173
to develop in the biotechnology world. While the idea is still young
174
and major pharmaceutical companies still rely on the patent system,
this parallel movement shows that the patent system, as currently
constituted and perhaps in conjunction with modes of innovation, is
perfectly capable of adapting itself to the demands of rapidly evolving
technologies and industries. This adaptability applies with equal
force to perceived problems with damages awards.
C. Normative Reasons for Retaining the Current Approach over
Mandatory Apportionment
Support for the current damages system has spread outside the
realm of the chemical and pharmaceutical industries. President
George W. Bush’s administration expressed its reservations about
moving away from the current approach because such a shift may
promote infringement and reduce the incentive function of patent
175
law.
Importantly, the administration stated that “encouraging invention within particular business models or technology sectors must
176
not come at the expense of innovation in others,” which the proposed apportionment approach would likely do.
Instead,
“[i]nnovation . . . will be encouraged in all industries by giving
[f]ederal judges the flexibility to apply appropriate economic principles to the facts of each case, consistent with the business model or tech177
nology.” This language continues the theme of the Federal Circuit’s
recognition that each type of invention poses unique challenges that

171
172
173
174
175
176
177

Id. at 395–97.
Id. at 395.
Joly, supra note 167, at 391–94.
See supra notes 66–71 and accompanying text.
See Wienecke, supra note 34, at 2.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
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merit close consideration and adaptation of general patent-law prin178
ciples to the facts in each case.
Given certain industries’ opposing views of the utility of the pa179
tent system and proper calculation of damages, analyzing the potential effects of mandatory apportionment on each side is helpful.
In a variation on a common formulation appearing in proposed statutes, apportionment would focus on a “specific contribution over
180
the prior art.” This language connotes a per se requirement for actual, tangible improvement or benefit to the public. Satisfying this
element for technology inventions would not pose insurmountable
difficulties because demonstrating the utility of these products is of181
ten straightforward.
For mechanical inventions, the inventor can
easily provide diagrams or pictures that highlight the functionality
182
and “physicality” of the device. But the utility requirement is more
difficult to meet for chemical, pharmaceutical, and biological inven183
tions, which may “possess an evolving utility” in many instances.
Even if this dichotomy is unobjectionable and can be accommodated
during the examining phase, effectively permitting a utility requirement at the damages phase would unfairly subject pharmaceutical patents to an additional post-grant hurdle that many technological in184
ventions do not encounter.
Adding a supplementary utility
requirement will tend to make enforcement of a patent more difficult, will deter companies from seeking patent protection if the patent’s enforceability is dubious, and will therefore deprive the public

178

See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part II.B.
180
Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. § 4(a) (2009) (as referred to S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009) (adding 35 U.S.C. § 284(c)(1)(C)); Patent
Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. § 5(a) (2009) (as referred to H.R.
Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009) (adding 35 U.S.C. § 284(c)(1)(C)).
181
See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); KIEFF ET AL., supra note 43, at 740.
182
KIEFF ET AL., supra note 43, at 740.
183
Id. The difficulty that science-based inventions face with regard to meeting the
utility requirement is evident in a Supreme Court case that set a high standard for
utility of processes and appeared to minimize the role of implements to further
scientific research. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 531–36 (1966) (“But a patent
is not a hunting license. It is not a reward for the search, but compensation for its
successful conclusion.”). Interestingly, some have disputed this position, including
the venerable Judge Rich. See In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 949 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (Rich, J.,
dissenting) (“I believe . . . that usefulness to chemists doing research on steroids, as
intermediates to make other compounds . . . is sufficient.”); see also Brenner, 383 U.S.
at 536–40 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
184
See Opderbeck, supra note 88, at 166–70.
179
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of drugs or drug precursors that could prove infinitely valuable at
some future date.
A number of commentators and government entities suggest
that the Patent and Trademark Office issues unworthy patents and
185
that the patent system is seriously flawed.
The workings of the office and quality of issued patents may indeed be problematic, but various provisions of the 2009 Act address some of these perceived problems before the issue of damages even arises. Apportionment, which
would take place at the damages stage long after a patent is granted
and liability is determined, would not be effective in addressing the
quality of an issued patent. Other solutions would confront patent
quality and examination problems at an earlier stage and thus more
effectively. For example, the 2009 Act would convert the U.S. patent
system from a first-to-invent to a first-to-file procedure and thereby
186
eliminates the need for interference proceedings.
Interference
proceedings can delay or prevent the issuance of a patent and therefore can serve as an impediment to any commercial success that a
putative patentee may anticipate. The 2009 Act also discusses detailed prior-art submission and post-grant opposition procedures,

185
See, e.g., Harkins, supra note 20, at 432–33 (stating that “patent quality is a genuine topic for debate” and that only allowing issuance of high-quality patents has
“proven to be an elusive goal and perhaps an unattainable target to date”); see also
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED TO
BETTER MANAGE PATENT OFFICE AUTOMATION AND ADDRESS WORKFORCE CHALLENGES 1
(2008) (Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Court, the Internet, and Intellectual
Property, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Statement of Anu K. Mittal, Director, Science
and Technology Issues, and Linda D. Koontz, Director, Information Management
Issues), available at http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS64135 (“Rapid growth in
both the volume and complexity of patent applications to [the] USPTO has lengthened the time needed to process patents and has raised concerns among intellectual property organizations, patent holders, and others about the quality of the patents that are issued.”).
186
Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 610, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009) (as referred to S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 17, 2009); Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th
Cong. § 2 (2009) (as referred to S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009); Patent
Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009) (as referred to H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009). Priority in the U.S. patent system is unlike other countries in that it allows an inventor who filed second to still obtain a patent on his invention if he can prove that his invention date is earlier than the other party’s invention date. See 3A CHISUM, supra note 149, § 10.01. In other words, the United States
will grant a patent to the first inventor, as long as his invention meets the statutory
predicates. In other countries, the filing date is dispositive; the first party to file is
the only party who can patent that invention. Id.
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which are aimed at improving the quality of issued patents and allow187
ing cancellation of invalid claims.
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO APPORTIONMENT
A. The Best Bet: Elimination of the Reasonable-Royalty Floor
The current version of 35 U.S.C. § 284 sets “reasonable royalties”
as the mandatory minimum damages award for patent infringe188
ment. Damages for patent infringement are meant to compensate
the patentee for his loss and are not computed with reference to the
189
gain or loss of the infringer.
Assuming that, in some instances, a
patent holder has absolutely no financial loss resulting from the infringement, such as when the patented and putatively infringing
products are sold in completely different markets or the patented
product is not sold or licensed at all, why Congress would insist on
setting a minimum is peculiar. But instead of guaranteeing only nominal damages plus a mandatory injunction or even nominal damages alone, Congress left the minimum at a reasonable-royalty level.
Courts have supplied a rich body of jurisprudence regarding the definition of the statutory language. In many cases, courts have
adopted a test that “envisions and ascertains the results of a hypothetical negotiation between the patentee and the infringer at a time be190
fore the infringing activity began.”
One way to change this established law on infringement damages is to eliminate the reasonable-royalty floor. This modification
could introduce into the patent system a number of benefits. Without a reasonable royalty standard, a smaller or independent inventor
on a strict litigation budget could seek nominal damages and an injunction rather than going through the expense and time of providing evidence for a hypothetical license negotiation in a past or hypo191
thetical market. The inventor would not have to hire a high-priced

187
S. 515 § 5; H.R. 1260 § 6. Senator Kyl’s version also includes sections on “PostGrant Review Proceedings” and “Submissions by Third Parties and Other Quality
Enhancements.” S. 610 §§ 5, 7.
188
35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
189
Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 507 (1964)
(quoting Coupe v. Royer, 155 U.S. 565, 582 (1895)).
190
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 869–70 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (citing Riles v. Shell Exploration & Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302, 1311 (Fed. Cir.
2002)), vacated, 545 U.S. 193 (2005).
191
See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified on other grounds, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971).
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expert in economics to address the Georgia-Pacific factors, which
would be an attractive idea if lower expenses would reduce the barrier to enforcing the patent via litigation. Although few, if any, inventors or patent holders would sue for nominal damages, an injunction
may be quite valuable in a practical sense. The threat of injunction
can be a powerful tool for an inventor to wield in negotiations with
193
potential infringers. Injunctive relief may not be as certain as it was
even several years ago, but it is still available if a patentee establishes
194
the traditional equitable factors warranting this remedy.
By eliminating the reasonable-royalty minimum, Congress would
not concurrently eliminate a patentee’s prospect of damages. Reasonable royalties could represent one option for damages rather than
the mandatory minimum award. Also, if the patentee, perhaps an
independent inventor or small company, could show actual damages
and chooses not to seek reasonable royalties, the lost-profits measure
195
of damages would still be available. If litigation costs are less problematic, however, reasonable royalties as a measure of damages would
still be available. The system might simply experience a downward
adjustment in the number of suits in which reasonable royalties are
sought.
Additionally, allowing a damages award to take the form of nominal damages and permitting such results to become commonplace
could have a subsidiary effect of reducing the demand for “patent
196
trolls” that have leverage simply because the patentee is a small-time
entity without a budget to fund infringement litigation. Even if patent trolls perform at least some beneficial functions, such as market
197
clearing and highlighting otherwise obscure prior art, that good
work would be preserved because the market in which they work
would continue to exist. Less pressure would be placed on independent inventors to relinquish their rights to trolls because the inventors could afford to enforce the patents on their own. Demand for
192

Id. at 1120.
See, e.g., supra notes 103–06 and accompanying text. Research in Motion settled for an enormous amount of money because the threat of BlackBerry users losing
their service was a shudder-inducing prospect not only for the company but also for
its many customers. See Ken Belson, Not the End of the World After All, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
26, 2006, § 4, at 2; supra note 106.
194
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391–92 (2006).
195
See Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th
Cir. 1978).
196
Harkins, supra note 20, at 410; see also supra notes 98–106 and accompanying
text.
197
See McDonough III, supra note 107.
193
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trolls would decrease and relieve, at least as to this issue, serious and
likely justified concerns of large technology companies currently
198
seeking reform. Presumably, the desire of non-practicing entities to
purchase patents would decline without a guaranteed reasonable199
royalty award upon a finding of infringement. An allegedly infringing company could rely on the prospect that nominal damages would
be awarded and would be less likely to pay a high settlement. This reticence would reduce the incentive for a non-practicing patent holder
to sue when it has no cognizable damages or an otherwise weak case.
The fact that an injunction may be available does not change this
scenario because patent trolls probably could not meet the heigh200
tened requirements. A practicing entity, such as a pharmaceutical
or large technology company, presumably could meet the test, making
an injunction a worthwhile companion to the prospect of nominal
damages.
Removing the reasonable-royalty floor could also work to the
benefit of the pharmaceutical and chemical industries in that adjusting the value of infringement awards downward would correspon201
dingly reduce the value of royalty stacking. While such issues arise
202
often in the technology industries, given the “incremental” nature
203
of the typical invention, similar problems may arise in the sciences.
If each individual royalty amount or a portion of the aggregated
royalties is reduced, the overall cost of producing a composite invention and defending it in patent lawsuits decreases. This result would
reduce some of the concern inherent in royalty stacking.
A counterargument might posit that an inventor would lack any
incentive to litigate if he is only guaranteed nominal damages. The
198

See Markoff, supra note 67 (referencing “Intel, Microsoft, I.B.M. and Apple” as
companies that want to limit the strength of trolls and “small patent holders”); see
also Patent Reform, supra note 1, at 4–8 (statement of Steven R. Appleton).
199
See Harkins, supra note 20, at 439–40 (suggesting that patent trolls derive motivation and work, inter alia, by either prompting large settlements from companies
averse to litigation costs or by “leveraging the acquired patents into a license mill . . .
for royalty rates far in excess of the claimed invention of the threatened patent”).
200
These requirements are described in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S.
388, 391–92 (2006).
201
For a brief competition-centered explanation of the notion of royalty stacking,
see FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 20, ch. 2, at 32–33.
202
See Samuelson et al., supra note 31, at 2330 (discussing software).
203
See, e.g., Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 871 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (“[T]he number of patent licenses needed to develop a drug may also affect the value placed on any single technology used in the development process. The
cumulative effect of such stacking royalties can be substantial, particularly when
reach-through royalties come into play.”)
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fact that the inventor would still have an option to seek lost profits or
a reasonable royalty could force an infringing company to contemplate a license because any threat of litigation would prompt the
company to consider the value of the patented invention in its own
product. If the patented component is valuable to that company, licensing could lead to a major reward for the inventor, particularly if a
license agreement was reached before trial. The downside to nominal damages is that the patentee’s licensing power might instead decrease because a company may be more likely to infringe and risk a
suit. The solution to this dilemma is a strong right to injunctive re204
lief, but the case law is still adjusting on this issue.
Particularly noteworthy with regard to this counterargument is
that, even under the above analysis, which appears initially to favor
patentees over large technology companies, the company can nonetheless engage in a more considered, careful analysis of whether to
seek a license. If nominal damages would be the maximum exposure
(aside from legal fees), a company making a highly intricate technology-based product would likely feel less pressure to settle in situations
such as that recently facing Research in Motion in the BlackBerry
205
dispute.
B. A Statutory Damages Regime
A statutory damages regime modeled on the copyright damages
statute could accompany elimination of the reasonable-royalty floor
in patent law. Patentees would admittedly have little incentive to litigate if nominal damages were the new statutory minimum and injunctive relief, although potentially helpful, was not certain. Carefully measured legislative relief could step in at this juncture. Congress
could decide to set a low statutory minimum within a schedule rather
206
than retain the ambiguous “reasonable royalty.”
Plaintiffs in copyright-infringement suits can elect to recover “actual damages and any additional profits of the infringer” or, alterna207
tively, “statutory damages.” Statutory damages under this provision
range from $750 to $30,000 per infringed work with the final award
208
fixed at an amount the court “considers just.”
Where a plaintiff

204

See eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 393–94.
See Austen, supra note 106; see also supra text accompanying notes 101–104.
206
35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). Statutory minimums exist in copyright law. See 17
U.S.C. § 504 (2006).
207
17 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1)–(2), (b), (c).
208
Id. § 504(c)(1).
205
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elects the statutory damages option, the copyright laws provide for
adjustment of these statutory minimums upward for willfulness and
downward for a lack of intent for or the absence of a reasonable be209
lief of infringement. A court may also consider factors in deciding
an amount of statutory damages that include the “expenses saved and
profits reaped by the defendants” because of their infringement and
210
the plaintiff’s resultant lost revenues. Courts may, in the exercise of
wide discretion, consider the “deterrent effect of the award on a de211
The copyright law also contains a
fendant and on third parties.”
provision that courts must remit statutory damages if an infringer
reasonably and actually believed his infringement was fair use and
qualifies as a nonprofit library or public broadcasting employee in
212
the context of the infringing use.
Patent law could successfully adopt a similar statutory-damages
framework that would address concerns about uncertain damages
awards without diminishing the incentives for pharmaceutical research. Congress could set minimum and maximum amounts and
the courts could supply the necessary interpretation. The “expenses
saved and profits reaped” factor could come directly from copyright
213
jurisprudence because research in patent-eligible fields is likely to
be hastened and the cost reduced if an infringer simply copies the
steps of a patented and well-explicated invention description. The
infringer’s product would therefore reach the market earlier and
more cheaply than would have been practicable in the absence of the
infringement. The notion of adjusting amounts upward and downward within the framework according to culpability or lack thereof is
214
already familiar to patent law and could become helpful in a new
context.
If Congress imported into patent law the copyright infringement
damages framework, the need for the complicated reasonable-royalty
calculation would be greatly reduced, as would the risk to the paten209

Id. § 504(c)(2).
N.A.S. Import, Corp. v. Chenson Enters., Inc., 968 F.2d 250, 252 (2d Cir. 1992)
(quoting 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.04[B],
at 14-41 (3d ed. 1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
211
Playboy Enters. v. Webbworld Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543, 560 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (citations omitted).
212
17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006). This is the Teacher-Librarian-Broadcaster Exception. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHTS §
14.04[B][2][b] (4th ed. 2008).
213
N.A.S. Import, Corp., 968 F.2d at 252 (internal quotations omitted).
214
35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006); see also In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed.
Cir. 2007).
210
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tee inherent in the process. If a patentee alleging infringement
thought that he might have difficulty proving actual damages, he
would then have the option of proving a reasonable royalty amount.
If the patentee had not previously licensed the patent in suit, making
215
the computation of an “established royalty” difficult or impossible,
or if the alleged infringer had not executed licenses on similar patents, making establishment of a “rate[] paid by the licensee for the
use of other patents comparable to the patent in suit” highly specula216
tive, the patentee may want to select the statutory damages option
instead (if made available). A guaranteed return—one more specific
than the current statutory floor—upon an infringement finding
would eliminate the possibility that a reasonable royalty would be set
at a very low amount and would also work to make sure that the patentee is compensated for unquantifiable, intangible losses. On the
opposite side, statutory minimums would afford larger entities, particularly technology companies, notice of the amount for which they
may be held liable for infringing a component patent in a sophisticated, multi-part product. This notice function lends more certainty
to the area of damages awards than exists under the current reasonable-royalty regime.
A cautionary point arises by comparison to the copyright statutes. Much of copyright law has evolved in response to new technol217
ogies, and one result is that the law contains various “special
218
The factors to consider in patent
schemes” of statutory damages.
law, if Congress opts for a statutory damages regime, should not go so
far. In fact, several recently proposed factors would accomplish a
shift too far in the direction of specificity and should be generally
219
avoided.

215

Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
216
Id.
217
The legislative history to 17 U.S.C. § 102 suggests that Congress had to balance
concerns about making sure to limit the scope of copyright without eliminating the
possibility of protection for new types of expression. CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT
LAW: SEVENTH EDITION: 2008 CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT 463–64 (2008) (quoting House
Report on the Copyright Act of 1976, H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5659).
218
4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 212, § 14.04[B][1][a].
219
See Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. § 4(a) (2009) (as referred
to S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009); Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260,
111th Cong. § 5(a) (2009) (as referred to H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3,
2009).
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V. CONCLUSION
Damages apportionment favors inventions deriving from the
technology sector at the expense of pharmaceutical inventions. The
nature of inventions to be patented in these industries differs to such
an extent that, if an additional, post-grant requirement of damages
apportionment is mandated, science- and pharmaceutical-based inventions would be subject to greater hurdles in proving entitlement
220
to damages while the concerns of the technology sector regarding
221
high damages awards and hold-up would unilaterally be addressed.
To avoid thrusting this uneven effect upon the various industrylevel users of the patent system, Congress should not mandate damages apportionment. Instead, Congress should allow the courts to
continue adapting the current patent provisions to inventions in each
222
particular case, which the courts have done successfully for decades.
The evolving jurisprudence on other provisions of Title 35 patenting
223
requirements, such as utility and nonobviousness, illustrates that
courts are fully capable of shaping the law to conform to the demands of industry users without the need for potentially overrestrictive legislative interference.
In the event that statutory reform is unavoidable, legislative in224
tervention should be of a lesser degree than apportionment.
Specifically, eliminating the current reasonable royalty minimum would
deflate any artificially inflated damages awards by indirectly attacking
a perceived patent-troll problem while declining to interfere with legitimate patent rights. Substituting a floor of either nominal or statutorily enumerated damages, while still permitting recovery of reasonable royalties or lost profits if a patentee so elects, could address the
concerns of the technology industry without creating additional postgrant hurdles for the pharmaceutical and chemical industries. An
additional beneficial and patent-strengthening consequence of eliminating the current reasonable-royalty floor, one which also addresses patent trolls, lies in the encouragement of small inventors to
retain their patents and enforce them if litigation costs are reduced.

220

S. 515 § 4(a) (adding 35 U.S.C. § 284(c)(1)(C)); H.R. 1260 § 5(a) (adding 35
U.S.C. § 284(c)(1)(C)); see supra Part II.B.
221
See supra Part II.B.
222
Indeed, the new gatekeeper provision may do just that. See supra note 9.
223
35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 (2006).
224
See supra Part IV.
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At the most basic level, the U.S. patent system is meant “[t]o
225
Although the
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”
contours of patent protection have expanded and contracted over
time, this bedrock remains unchanged. An approach to patent
reform that stifles innovation in science-based industries while manipulating the system in favor of technology companies would fundamentally hinder that purpose. Responding to the complaints of
technology companies with apportionment is particularly dangerous
because large technology companies often forgo or minimize the role
of patent protection and instead exploit their inventions through
226
cross-licensing and reliance on market power.
Thus, while the
main beneficiaries of damages apportionment would see only marginal improvement, other industries may experience substantial weakening in the very foundations of their respective industries. The patent laws should not cease to perform their incentive function simply
because the legal framework no longer fits an industry’s business
model, such as, in this case, that of the technology companies. While
the patent laws need not apply in an unduly rigid fashion that ignores
the needs of patentees and potential patentees, they must perform in
an evenhanded and effective way. Apportionment does not seek to
achieve that end in every case and should be avoided in resolving debates over proper application of the patent laws.

225
226

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text.

